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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Public sector employment of immigrants can increase their economic assimilation 
and potentially improve their treatment by government.  Yet, as we show using Census 
data from 1990, 2000, and 2009-11, immigrants are substantially under-represented in 
federal, state, and local governments.  To understand why, we use logit analysis for 
federal and for state and local government employment in each time period to test 
whether immigrants’ weaker educational attainment and English proficiency, lower 
probabilities of being citizens and military veterans, and different age, gender, and 
race/ethnicity distributions can explain that under-representation.  Disparities in 
education and preferential government treatment of veterans are factors, but citizenship 
requirements appear to be the major obstacle to immigrant employment in the public 
sector.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Successful integration of the one-eighth of U.S. residents who are immigrants 
has important implications for U.S. economic and political systems.  Public sector 
employment can help immigrants assimilate economically, as government jobs have 
been an important route into the middle class for minorities and previous waves of 
immigrants (Ellis and Wright 1999; Logan, Alba, and Stults 2003).   The theory of 
representative bureaucracy in public administration suggests that representation of 
immigrants in government jobs, especially in positions with discretion in decision-
making, may have important policy and program benefits for the broader immigrant 
community (e.g., Kingsley 1944; Mosher 1968; Meier 1993; Selden 1997a; Keiser et al. 
2002).  Public sector employment may also be an important component of immigrants’ 
political incorporation (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010).  
Immigrants, however, are much less likely than native-born citizens to work in the 
public sector.  Using Census data for 1990, 2000, and 2009-11, we first show that 
immigrants make up smaller percentages of federal, state, and local government 
workers than of private sector workers in each period in almost every state.  Focusing 
on three occupations in state and local government (SLG) where representation is 
particularly important (Lewis and Pitts 2011), we find that managers, teachers, and 
police officers are even less likely than other SLG employees to be immigrants.  
Although immigrant representation in SLG work forces varies widely across states, in 
most it tends to be about half their representation in private sector work forces.   
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We then use individual-level data to try to explain the under-representation.  We 
expect government employment to lag population trends for a variety of political 
reasons, but various requirements of government jobs also impede immigrants’ 
opportunities to obtain public sector employment.  Perhaps most importantly, the federal 
government restricts competitive service jobs to U.S. citizens unless “there are no 
qualified citizens available,” and many state and local governments may have similar 
policies.  Public sector jobs also disproportionately require advanced education and 
English language proficiency, public sector employees tend to be older and more 
experienced, and most governments reward veterans for their military service with 
preferential treatment in hiring.  Thus, immigrants’ lower educational levels, weaker 
proficiency in English, younger ages, and lower likelihood of being veterans may all 
decrease their chances of public sector employment, relative to native-born citizens.  
Using logit models, we find citizenship to be the most important factor in immigrants’ 
under-representation, but veterans’ preference, education, English proficiency, and age 
distributions all play a role.     
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Adequate employment is a route to immigrants’ economic assimilation and social 
mobility (Marrow 2005).  As their time in the U.S., work experience, and English 
proficiency increase, immigrants’ earnings and occupational attainment tend to increase 
as well (Boyd 1993; Collins 1983).  Research on immigrant employment has largely 
focused on the private sector, especially self-employment in ethnic economies (e.g., 
Bates 1997; Fairlie and Robb 2007; Logan, Alba, and Stults 2003; Portes and Zhou 
4 
 
1996) and concentration in ethnic niche employment (Liu 2011; Waldinger 1994; Wright 
and Ellis 2000).  Earnings of new immigrants improved starting in the 1990s, partly due 
to immigration policy geared toward high-skilled workers (Borjas and Friedberg 2009).   
Government employment can improve the economic assimilation of immigrants, 
due to its relatively high pay, stable work conditions, and low level of discrimination.  In 
general, gender and racial/ethnic pay disparities among comparably educated and 
experienced employees tend to be smaller in the public than in the private sector 
(Borjas 1980; Asher and Popkin 1984; Singell 1991; Logan, Alba, and Stults 2003; Katz, 
Stern, and Fader 2007).  Those pay patterns, plus stronger formal protections against 
discrimination, help explain women’s and minorities’ higher preference for public sector 
employment (Blank 1985; Lewis and Frank 2002; Cohen, Zalamanovitch, and 
Davidesko 2006; Llorens, Wenger, and Kellough 2008). The public sector’s more 
meritocratic personnel system, smaller racial disparities in earnings, and greater stability 
make government jobs especially attractive to immigrants (Grodsky and Pager 2001; 
Sanders 2007).  Interview evidence shows that immigrants tend to find government jobs 
more stable and less prone to discriminatory practices than private sector jobs (Sanders 
2007) .   
 When immigrants get public sector jobs, some benefits extend to the broader 
immigrant community.  A bureaucracy whose demographic make-up mirrors that of the 
public can raise the government’s legitimacy by showing that it values all groups 
(Rosenbloom and Berry 1984; Crum and Naff 1997; Selden 1997b, 911) and convey 
messages to social groups about their status in society and how welcoming and 
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attentive government is to their needs (Schneider and Ingram 1997).  According to the 
theory of representative bureaucracy, this “passive representation” may also lead to 
“active representation,” with government employees consciously or unconsciously 
advancing the interests of groups to which they belong (Mosher 1968).  Thus, a 
representative bureaucracy may promote democratic ideals by ensuring that decision-
makers in the bureaucracy hear voices from all parts of the population (Kingsley 1944; 
Long 1949; Mosher 1968).   As government employment of minorities increases, 
outcomes for members of their groups improve (Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier 1993; 
Hindera 1993; Selden 1997b).  
Immigrants’ representation in government lags far behind their share of the 
general population, however. Sanders (2007) documents the under-representation of 
immigrants across all levels of government for 2000: 16.3% of native-born Americans 
worked for government, compared to 10.3% of immigrants.  Focusing on Los Angeles, 
Lim (2001) shows that immigrants make up fewer than 10% of local government 
workers, but more than 30% of all workers, largely due to citizenship rules and other 
institutional and policy constraints on public sector employment of immigrants.  While 
the election of black mayors played a major role in the employment of blacks in the 
nation’s big cities in the 1980s (Waldinger 1996; Eisinger 1982; Stein 1986), immigrants’ 
limited political power may restrict their entry.  The public sector’s relatively formal and 
bureaucratic recruiting mechanisms also reduce the importance of network hiring and 
employee referral that characterize immigrant employment in the private sector (Lim 
2001). Government’s standardized entry and promotion exams benefit highly educated 
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immigrants from the Pacific Rim and the Middle East but may hurt less-educated Latino 
immigrants and native blacks (Waldinger 1996). 
Probably the most important barrier to public sector employment for immigrants, 
especially in the federal service, is explicit hiring preference for citizens.  Under 
Executive Order 11935, which President Gerald Ford issued in 1976, the federal 
government cannot hire non-citizens into competitive service jobs (about three-quarters 
of federal jobs) unless no qualified U.S. citizens are available (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management 2010).  Citizenship requirements for SLG employment vary by state, but a 
citizenship requirement appears to be especially common for employment in law 
enforcement.  Naturalized citizens who immigrated as adults may also be less likely to 
secure public sector jobs because they needed to start their U.S. careers in the private 
sector. 
Other requirements of public sector jobs also work against immigrants.  First, the 
public sector work force tends to be highly educated.  One of the primary functions of 
SLGs is the provision of primary, secondary, and higher education, and the federal 
government employs an increasingly professional and administrative work force.  Far 
higher percentages of public than private sector workers have college diplomas, and 
educational attainment is a strong predictor of public sector employment (Blank 1985).  
As fewer than half of Hispanic immigrants have graduated from high school and only 
10% have college diplomas (Pew Hispanic Center 2011, Table 23), this decreases their 
probabilities of public sector employment.  Further, education received in the U.S. tends 
to be valued more highly by U.S. employers, including governments (Zeng and Xie 
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2004; Sanders 2007).  Although recent Asian immigrants tend to be better educated 
than natives (Yang 1999), with two-thirds of those arriving between 2000 and 2004 
having bachelor’s degrees (Gamage 2005), the education they bring with them may 
have less impact on their prospects for public sector employment than education 
received by native-born Americans.  Further, communication skills are crucial in many 
public sector jobs – including managers, teachers, and police officers -- and even 
naturalized citizens may have weaker language skills than native-born citizens (Sanders 
2007).    
Second, merit principles suggest that the government should prefer more 
experienced workers, and the percentage of workers who have public sector jobs 
increases with age (Lewis 2011).  In addition, patterns of public sector growth and 
decline have hurt younger Americans’ chances of government jobs.  The federal service 
expanded when Baby Boomers were entering the labor market but downsized under 
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, when Baby Boomers were in their 30s 
and 40s, the ages at which turnover is least common.  Federal hiring dropped in the 
1990s, and the mean age of federal new hires has increased steadily (Lewis 2010).  
Lewis (2011) found that 5% of full-time workers born in the 1940s and 1950s had 
federal jobs in 2009, compared to only 2.5% of those born in the 1970s.  Patterns for 
SLG employment are less clear.  Immigrants tend to be younger than native-born 
citizens.  The median age of foreign-born Hispanics is 38, three years younger than for 
native-born whites, and half of all Hispanic immigrant heads of households immigrated 
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after 1990, in the period since federal hiring dropped (Pew Hispanic Center 2011, Table 
40).     
Third, governments generally place more emphasis on equality of opportunity 
and affirmative action in hiring than private sector employers do.  As a result, women 
and minorities are more likely than comparable white men both to work in the public 
sector (Blank 1985) and to prefer government employment (Lewis and Frank 2002).  A 
lower expectation of discrimination should make public sector employment more 
attractive to immigrants, but if immigrants in the work force are disproportionately male, 
this could decrease their chances of public sector employment.  
Fourth, the federal service and most SLGs give veterans preferential treatment in 
hiring, and workers with military service are three-to-four times as likely as others to 
hold federal jobs (Sanders 2007; Lewis 2011).  Non-citizens rarely serve in the U.S. 
military (Leal 1999), and naturalized citizens who immigrated as adults are also less 
likely than native-born citizens to have military service.   
In sum, public sector employment may both speed immigrants’ assimilation into 
the middle class and advance immigrants’ interests in government decision-making.  
Although some research shows under-representation of immigrants in government, we 
know little about how that under-representation varies by level of government, time 
period, or state.  Active representation of immigrant interests may require a sufficient 
level of passive representation, salience of immigrant status in the policy context, and 
bureaucratic discretion (Keiser et al. 2002; Sowa and Selden 2003).  This suggests that 
passive representation is particularly important in occupations that have discretion to 
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make decisions with important implications for immigrants.  Research on active 
representation traditionally focused on managers (e.g., Meier and Nigro 1976), but has 
increasingly shifted to front-line workers with substantial discretion, especially police 
officers and teachers (Hill and Hupe 2002; Riccucci 2005; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003; Lewis and Pitts 2011). Immigrant managers may be more likely to hire 
and promote immigrant employees and to implement immigrant-friendly policies.  
Immigrant teachers may be more accommodating of immigrant children and children of 
immigrant parents (Marrow 2005, 2009).  Immigrant police officers might have better 
understanding of the needs of immigrant communities (Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007) 
.  
We expect immigrants to be under-represented in government employment in all 
levels, times, states, and occupations.  Citizenship requirements for many government 
jobs mean that under-representation should be much larger for non-citizens (many of 
whom are not here legally) than for naturalized citizens, especially in federal 
employment, where restrictions are stronger than in SLGs.  Because U.S. military 
service, educational attainment, English proficiency, and age all increase one’s 
probability of public sector employment, immigrants’ lower average age, educational 
attainment, fluency, and probability of qualifying for veterans’ preference should all 
contribute to their under-representation.  We assess the relative importance of these 
factors in explaining their under-representation.   
DATA AND METHODS 
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We examine representation of immigrants in three time periods, using the 5% 
Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the 1990 and the 2000 Census, plus 
combined data from the 2009, 2010, and 2011 American Community Surveys (ACS).  
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the ACS annually, largely to replace and improve 
upon the long form of the decennial census, but using smaller samples (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2009, 1).  We restrict our analysis to people who worked full-time (36+ hours per 
week for 50-52 weeks) in the civilian labor force during the prior year, dropping part-time 
workers but keeping the self-employed. This gives us samples of 2.3 to 3.5 million 
workers in each period.  We weight all analyses using Census-provided person weights. 
Our key variables are sector of employment and citizenship/immigration status.  
The Census asks where everyone in the household works and whether the employer is 
a federal, state, or local government; a nonprofit organization; or a for-profit firm.  
Respondents provide the name and address of the employer, allowing the Census to 
double-check the accuracy of the sector (Leete 2001).  The Census also asks each 
person’s citizenship status.  We classify naturalized citizens and non-citizens as 
immigrants, sometimes treating them together but usually treating them separately.   
We have no information on whether non-citizens are in the country legally.  The Census 
asks immigrants when they moved to the U.S. It also asks how well each person speaks 
English.  The literature indicates that immigrants’ time since arrival in the U.S. strongly 
affects their assimilation and economic success, but we cannot meaningfully hold this 
variable constant in comparing native-born citizens and immigrants.  We include it only 
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in analyses restricted to immigrants, but English proficiency should serve as a good 
proxy for length of stay and acculturation.  
We begin by examining whether immigrants are under-represented in 
government and whether that has changed over time. We calculate the percentage of 
full-time employees who are immigrants in each sector and each period to examine 
trends.  We examine inter-state variation in under-representation by graphing the 
percentages of SLG and of private sector employees in each state who are immigrants.  
We also calculate the immigrant percentage of SLG employees in three key 
occupations (managers, educators, and police officers) for all states.  
To understand the reasons for the under-representation, we shift to individual-
level analysis.  We use logit analysis to examine how strongly employees’ immigrant 
and citizenship status affect their probability of public sector employment after 
controlling for education, English language fluency, age, military service, race/ethnicity, 
and gender.  We first run logit models for each period on whether employees have 
federal jobs.  We then drop the federal employees and run logit analyses to determine 
whether employees hold SLG jobs.   
In general, we use the most detailed available measure of age, education, 
English language fluency, race/ethnicity, and gender available.  We restrict the sample 
to employees between the ages of 21 and 65 and use 44 dummy variables for age.  
This allows us to detect any relationship between age and employment in either sector 
in each year, capturing both a general migration of workers toward public sector jobs as 
they age and any trends in government growth and decline.  Likewise, we use dummy 
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variables for each level of education.1  Because gender differences vary across 
race/ethnicity groups, we use 11 dummy variables to capture both simultaneously (e.g., 
Latino male, African American female, other/mixed male).  We use a dummy variable to 
distinguish veterans from those with no U.S. military service.  In our analyses of SLG 
employment, we also include 50 dummy variables for the states in which employees 
work.  In our analysis of the combined 2009-11 ACS data, we add two dummy variables 
distinguishing among the years.  We use three dummy variables for ability to speak 
English (“not at all,” “not well,” and “well”; the reference group is people who only speak 
English or speak it “very well”).     
Our goal is to determine to what extent differences in these characteristics 
between immigrants and native-born citizens can account for immigrants’ under-
representation in government.  We begin with a base model that only includes the 
naturalized citizen and non-citizen dummy variables (plus the year dummy variables in 
the ACS analysis).  We then run the full model, which includes all the control variables 
described above.  If these factors play a major role in immigrants’ under-representation, 
the coefficients on the citizenship variables should shift substantially in a positive 
direction between the base and the full model.  Because we are interested in the unique 
impact of differences in age, education, English ability, race/ethnicity and gender, and 
military service on immigrants’ under-representation, we drop each set of variables 
separately from the full model.  If immigrant-native differences on that variable are a 
                                            
1
 Because we are not trying to describe the impact of age or education on the probability of public sector 
employment, we do not make the simplifying assumptions that the effect of education is linear and that 
the effect of age is parabolic.  If those are, in fact, the patterns, the dummy variables will capture them, 
and in samples of 3 million, degree of freedom does not pose an issue. 
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major contributor to under-representation, the coefficients on the citizenship variables 
should shift in a negative direction when it is dropped. 
To determine whether differences between naturalized citizens and non-citizens 
result from acculturation rather than citizenship, we run separate analyses on samples 
restricted to immigrants.  We use a set of dummy variables to represent arrival period.  
The “naturalized citizen” coefficient therefore represents differences between 
comparable naturalized citizens and non-citizens of the same English proficiency who 
have been in the country the same length of time. 
FINDINGS 
 Bureaucratic representation.  Immigrants make up a much smaller share of the 
public sector than of the private sector workforce.  In 2009-11, only about 9% of federal, 
state, and local government employees were immigrants, but immigrants composed 
18% of the for-profit and 13% of the nonprofit workforce.  Further, the immigrant share 
is growing more slowly in the public sector:  it doubled between 1990 and 2010 in the 
for-profit workforce but only rose by about two-thirds in the public sector.   
The percentage of SLG employees who are immigrants varies widely across the 
states, but it is lower than the percentage of private sector workers who are immigrants 
in all but two states2 (Figure 1).  The relationship between the two percentages is strong 
and linear, but nearly every state is well below the main diagonal (which represents 
equal public and private sector percentages).  Instead, the states cluster along a line 
                                            
2
 North Dakota and West Virginia are small states with low immigrant percentages, and sampling error is 
a possible explanation. 
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with only half the slope: the immigrant share in the public sector workforce rises only 
46% as rapidly as the immigrant share in the for-profit workforce in the same state.3   
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Immigrants compose more than one-tenth of the SLG workforce in five of our 
largest states (California, New York, Florida, New Jersey, and Texas, plus Hawaii) but 
3% or less of the public sector in 20 states (Table 1).  Immigrants typically make up a 
smaller share of managers and teachers than of the SLG workforce as a whole, and 
their representation among police officers is even lower.  Overall, immigrants make up 
16.1% of the SLG workforce, but only 7.7% of the teachers, 6.1% of the managers, and 
4.0% of the police.  The smaller representation in these three key occupations might be 
due to the high English language proficiency required of all three, but it probably limits 
government responsiveness to immigrant needs.   
[Table 1 about here] 
 Naturalized U.S. citizens are nearly as likely as native-born U.S. citizens to have 
federal jobs and are only somewhat less likely to hold SLG jobs, but non-citizens were 
only one-fourth as likely as native-born citizens to work in the public sector (Table 2).  In 
2009-11, for instance, 3.8% of native-born citizens held federal jobs, but that rate was 
0.5 percentage points lower for naturalized citizens (3.3% of them held federal jobs) and 
2.9 points lower for non-citizens (only 0.9% of them did).  At the same time, 14.0% of 
U.S.-born citizens worked for SLGs, but naturalized citizens and non-citizens were 4.3 
and 10.2 percentage points less likely to do so, respectively.  Naturalized citizens were 
                                            
3
 Graphs for the other two years show very similar patterns.  In regressions using states as the units of 
analysis, the slope varies only between .44 and .46 across the three years. The relationship is quite 
strong: the R2 values range from .89 to .92. 
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about 3 percentage points more likely than native-born citizens to be self-employed.  
Non-citizens were the most likely to work in the for-profit sector in every year, by a 
growing margin, with non-citizens 10.5 percentage points more likely than native-born 
citizens to work for private firms in 1990 and 14.7 percentage points more likely to do so 
in 2009-11.  Under-representation in state and local governments and in nonprofit 
organizations has grown over time, but it has been relatively stable for federal 
employment. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Immigrant-native differences in individual characteristics. Native-born 
citizens, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens differ in a variety of ways that affect their 
chances of public sector employment.  Non-citizens are 4.1 years younger, but 
naturalized citizens are 2.7 years older, than native-born citizens in the most recent 
period.  Naturalized citizens are only a little less educated than native-born citizens, but 
non-citizens had 2.0 fewer years of education in 1990 and 2.3 fewer years in 2009-11.  
In most years, however, both naturalized and non-citizens were more likely to have 
advanced degrees, and naturalized citizens were more likely to have bachelor’s 
degrees in all three periods.  The real difference is at the lowest educational levels. 
Currently, only 0.7% of native-born full-time workers do not have at least some high 
school, but 21.2% of non-citizens do not.   
 Unsurprisingly, immigrants are far less likely than native-born citizens to have 
served in the U.S. military.  The percentage of who were veterans fell from 22.8% to 
9.1% even for native-born citizens, but naturalized citizens were less than half as likely 
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to have had military service in all three years, and only 0.4% of non-citizens are 
currently veterans.  Immigrants were also far more likely than native-born citizens to be 
Hispanic or Asian.  More surprisingly, non-citizens with full-time jobs were much more 
likely than citizens to be men: in 2009-11, 56.2% of citizen and 67.9% of non-citizen full-
time workers were male. 
 Explaining the under-representation.  Table 3 examines the effects of being a 
naturalized citizen or non-citizen on the probability of federal and SLG employment after 
controlling for differences in age, education, race, sex, relationship status, and military 
experience.  All the key logit coefficients are highly significant (unsurprisingly, given 
samples of 2.4 to 3.9 million) and remarkably stable over time and across sectors.  
Across the six federal and SLG models, all but one non-citizen coefficient is between -
0.89 and -1.04.  All six naturalized citizen coefficients are between -0.21 and -0.55.  
That is, despite dramatic rises in immigration and changes in the immigrant population 
over the past twenty years, the impact of immigrant and citizenship status has barely 
changed.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 Because probabilities are nonlinear functions of the independent variables, there 
is no uniquely correct way to convert logit coefficients into probability differences; we 
use the actual percentages of native-born citizens who hold federal and SLG jobs as 
our base probabilities.  The next two lines in Table 3 show the difference in probability 
for naturalized citizens and non-citizens with the same characteristics.  In 2009-11, for 
instance, 3.8% of native-born citizens worked for the federal government and a 14.1% 
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worked for an SLG.  A naturalized citizen with the same characteristics was 1.5 
percentage points less likely to be a federal employee and 3.3 points less likely to be an 
SLG employee.   For non-citizens, the “unexplained” differences in probability of federal 
and SLG employment were 2.7 and 7.9 percentage points, respectively. 
Table 3B repeats the citizenship coefficients for the full models, then shows 
those for separate models run only on Latinos or only on Asians.  In almost all cases, 
coefficients are larger in the Latinos-only and smaller in the Asians-only models than for 
the samples as a whole.  The differences are striking for naturalized citizens in the 
federal employment models: naturalized Asian Americans are almost as likely as 
comparable native-born Asian Americans to hold federal jobs, but native-born Latinos 
are much more likely than their naturalized counterparts to do so.  In the SLG models, 
differences between naturalized and native-born citizens are quite similar for Latinos 
and Asians, but differences between non-citizens and native-born citizens are much 
larger for Latinos than for Asians in two years. 
 Table 4 focuses on the extent to which citizenship, English proficiency, 
education, veteran status, and age explain immigrants’ under-representation.  Most 
obviously, citizenship is a key factor.  In the base models, which do not control for 
individual characteristics, the naturalized citizen coefficients are nearly zero in the 
federal models: naturalized and native-born citizens are nearly equally likely to hold 
federal jobs.  In both the federal and SLG models, the non-citizen coefficient is always 
far larger than the naturalized citizen coefficient, in the base and full models and in all 
the variations. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
The full model did a surprisingly poor job of explaining why immigrants were less 
likely than native-born citizens to hold public sector jobs in 1990 and 2000 (and federal 
jobs in 2009-11).  The naturalized citizen coefficient grows in both the federal and SLG 
models in both years when the control variables are added, suggesting naturalized 
citizens’ under-representation was harder to understand after taking all these 
differences into account than before.  The non-citizen coefficients in both years were 
similar in the base models, with no control variables, and the full models, which 
compare non-citizens to native-born citizens of the same age, education, English 
proficiency, veteran status, race/ethnicity, and sex.  
The only cases where the control variables explain a major portion of immigrants’ 
under-representation is for non-citizens in 2009-11 (coefficients fall from about -1.50 to -
1.29 in the federal model and from -1.44 to -0.91 in the SLG model).  In the most recent 
time period, all four factors appear to play a role: the naturalized and non-citizen 
coefficients grow if any variable is dropped from the full model.  Immigrants’ low 
probability of having served in the U.S. military appears to be most important factor in 
their under-representation in the federal service: dropping veteran status from the model 
enlarges the naturalized citizen coefficients from -0.52 to -0.80 and the non-citizen 
coefficient from -1.29 to -1.62.  English proficiency matters most in SLG under-
representation:  both coefficients rise most if it is dropped from the model, but the 
increases are much smaller.   
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Analysis of the immigrants-only samples (not shown) suggests that part of the 
apparent effect of citizenship is acculturation – the naturalized citizen logit coefficient 
shrinks by about 10% when date of arrival in the U.S. is added.  This small change 
suggests that most of the reason naturalized citizens are more likely to hold government 
jobs than apparently comparable non-citizens is formal citizenship requirements for 
government jobs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Immigrant employment in government has both economic and political 
significance. Public sector jobs matter not only to immigrants who get them, but also to 
the broader immigrant community and society at large. While much research on 
immigrants’ labor market assimilation has examined their economic mobility in the 
private sector and as entrepreneurs, public sector employment provides a good route to 
economic stability for immigrants by offering relatively good pay, benefits, and job 
security.  Historically, public sector jobs have been a key route into the middle class for 
several waves of immigrants, for example, the Irish and more recently Puerto Ricans 
(Logan, Alba, and Stults 2003).  
 Immigrants’ employment in the public sector also increases their political 
incorporation and participation.  Structural assimilation through entry into the host 
society’s institutions is an important stage in their overall adaptation process (Gordon 
1964). Increased representation of immigrants in public bureaucracies could improve 
how government addresses the interests of the broader immigrant community.  
Researchers in the representative bureaucracy tradition find that the demographic 
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make-up of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and imply that a bureaucracy that 
mirrors the public will make policy decisions more in line with the public interest.  Having 
immigrants or other Latino “cultural brokers” working in public school systems can, for 
instance, affect implementation of English-only laws in ways that improve instructional 
methods and resist negative messages (Marschall, Rigby, and Jenkins 2011).  Thus, 
uncovering the causes and consequences of representation in the public sector can 
have important outcomes for immigrants as well as various public policies affecting 
them.   
This article shows that immigrants are under-represented at all levels of 
government relative to their share in private for-profit and nonprofit employment, 
however, and the under-representation grew over the past two decades. The immigrant 
share in SLGs varies widely across states, is highest in our most-populous states, and 
is highly correlated with the immigrant share of the state population.  The immigrant 
percentages are particularly low among managers, teachers, and police, three 
occupations where the level of bureaucratic discretion suggests that representation of 
immigrants could have the greatest positive impact on the broader immigrant 
community.  
 Citizenship requirements appear to be the main obstacle to immigrants in 
obtaining public sector jobs.  Naturalized citizens are nearly as likely as native-born 
citizens to work for the government, though the gap widens rather than narrows when a 
variety of individual qualifications are controlled for.  Non-citizens, however, are 
dramatically less likely than equally educated and English-fluent citizens (both 
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naturalized and native-born) of the same age, race, sex, and veteran status to obtain 
public sector jobs.  Differences in education, English fluency, age, military service, 
gender, and race/ethnicity can explain a little of non-citizens’ under-representation but 
none of naturalized citizens’ under-representation. It suggests that other barriers might 
exist that prevent immigrants from entry into government employment.  
Existing literature has well documented the importance of ethnic networks and 
network hiring to immigrant employment, which also contributes to the formation of 
immigrant niches (Waldinger, 1994, 2001). The fact that immigrants are not adequately 
represented in the existing government workforce might imply that ethnic networks are 
not yet established within the public sector for the current generation of immigrants. 
Detailed analysis of the hiring mechanisms of public sector jobs, as well as identification 
of immigrant-concentrated occupations within government can help solve the puzzle. 
Another important area of future study is to examine the variation in immigrants’ 
government employment across cities and communities in order to understand the role 
local contexts and institutions play in their public sector participation.  
Government employment is an important route to the middle class for 
immigrants.  Increasing the immigrant representation at all levels of government can 
help achieve a bureaucracy that is representative of the populations it serves. Recent 
cohorts are less likely to be naturalized citizens than earlier cohorts (Johnson et al. 
1999). As such, citizenship requirements for public sector employment appear to be 
having a greater impact on more recent arrivals.  While certain institutional barriers 
remain, we might expect that immigrants’ representation in various levels of government 
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will increase over time with the continued inflow of immigrants and the growing 
population of their second-generation children. Comparing the U.S. case to other major 
immigrant-receiving countries like Canada and Australia can also provide useful insights 
on how different institutional arrangement and government employment requirements 
yield different outcomes.  
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TABLE 1. Percentage of SLG Employees Who Were Immigrants, by State, 2009-11 
 
 All   
 Employees Managers Teachers Police 
United States 16.1 6.1 7.7 4.0 
 
California 20.9 14.9 15.6 9.9 
New York  16.7 12.9 14.1 8.5 
New Jersey  13.8 7.7 14.5 4.4 
Florida  13.6 12.5 11.6 5.6 
Hawaii  11.5 8.3 11.5 6.5 
Texas  10.6 5.7 9.3 4.2 
Arizona  9.3 7.3 8.6 6.4 
Washington 9.0 6.4 7.5 3.8 
Massachusetts 8.9 6.9 6.9 4.2 
Maryland  8.8 7.1 10.3 4.2 
Nevada  8.3 7.6 6.0 3.6 
Rhode Island 8.0 1.2 6.4 10.6 
Connecticut 7.7 5.8 6.1 3.9 
Illinois  7.4 5.9 7.8 2.5 
Virginia  6.4 4.5 7.0 2.9 
Delaware  6.1 13.0 7.8 2.5 
Oregon  6.0 4.3 9.4 3.2 
New Mexico 5.7 4.7 7.1 2.3 
Alaska  5.6 2.5 9.1 1.2 
Colorado  5.2 3.4 4.6 3.5 
Minnesota  5.1 3.4 6.6 2.3 
Vermont  4.7 2.7 5.6 2.2 
Georgia  4.6 3.7 5.6 1.1 
Michigan  4.4 3.8 7.3 0.9 
Utah  4.3 2.7 4.3 3.8 
Idaho  4.1 1.4 4.6 1.2 
Kansas  4.0 1.8 5.6 3.1 
Wisconsin  3.9 3.6 5.8 0.5 
Iowa  3.7 0.3 3.8 2.5 
North Carolina 3.6 1.8 4.6 1.2 
Nebraska  3.6 0.0 3.1 0.0 
New Hampshire 3.4 1.4 2.0 2.2 
Indiana  3.3 3.3 4.9 0.7 
Oklahoma  3.1 1.6 3.9 1.0 
Ohio  3.1 1.8 4.5 0.3 
North Dakota 2.9 0.0 6.9 0.0 
Maine  2.9 3.3 1.3 0.2 
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Pennsylvania 2.9 1.2 3.1 2.4 
Wyoming  2.8 3.3 4.1 0.0 
South Carolina 2.6 1.4 3.4 0.9 
Louisiana  2.6 1.4 5.4 0.7 
Tennessee  2.3 1.6 3.0 1.0 
Arkansas  2.3 1.0 2.1 0.7 
Alabama  2.1 0.8 3.5 0.9 
Missouri  2.1 2.5 2.9 1.0 
Kentucky  2.1 0.5 3.0 1.6 
Montana  1.9 0.3 3.5 1.1 
South Dakota 1.9 0.7 4.6 1.5 
Mississippi 1.8 1.8 3.0 0.0 
West Virginia 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.0 
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TABLE 2.  Percentage Working in each Sector by Citizenship Status and Year  
 
  1990   2000   2009-11 
 
  U.S.-bornNaturalized Non- U.S.-bornNaturalized Non- U.S.-bornNaturalized Non- 
Sector Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen Citizen 
Federal government  4.6 -0.3 -3.2 3.6 -0.2 -2.5 3.8 -0.5 -2.9 
State government  4.8 -1.3 -2.5 4.9 -1.3 -2.8 5.4 -1.8 -3.6 
Local government  6.4 -1.2 -3.6 6.7 -1.4 -4.4 8.6 -2.5 -6.6 
Nonprofit organizations 5.9 -0.3 -1.0 6.6 -0.8 -2.3 8.1 -1.1 -3.1 
For-profit firms 69.1 -0.1 +10.5 69.1 +1.3 +13.1 66.6 +2.7 +14.7 
Self-employed 9.3 +3.2 -0.3 9.1 +2.4 -1.1 8.1 +3.3 +0.5 
 
Characteristics 
Age (mean years) 39.2 +3.0 -2.0 41.0 +2.1 -4.1 42.8 +2.3 -4.1 
 
Education (mean years) 13.6 -0.3 -2.0 13.8 -0.3 -2.1 14.2 -0.3 -2.3 
No high school 2.4 +8.6 +20.5 1.1 +7.5 +20.5 0.7 +6.3 +20.5 
Some high school 9.1 +1.3 +6.2 6.9 +3.1 +9.5 3.7 +3.0 +9.9 
High school graduate 31.6 -12.0 -11.7 28.6 -9.8 -9.1 25.5 -5.6 -1.5 
Some college 31.6 -5.3 -12.1 33.9 -13.5 -17.2 34.0 -8.5 -18.9 
Bachelor’s degree 17.0 +1.5 -4.7 19.7 +1.6 +0.5 23.6 +0.4 -9.8 
Master’s degree 5.2 +2.5 +0.4 6.4 +2.3 +0.6 8.8 +1.9 -1.0 
Professional degree 2.2 +1.6 0.0 2.3 +1.4 +0.1 2.5 +1.0 -0.7 
Doctorate 0.9 +1.6 +1.2 1.0 +1.4 +1.7 1.3 +1.5 +1.5 
 
Military service 22.8 -13.3 -20.6 14.2 -8.8 -12.6 9.1 -6.1 -8.7 
 
Male 61.8 -0.9 +4.8 59.5 -0.6 +12.2 56.2 -0.4 +11.7 
White nonHispanic 85.4 -47.1 -60.5 82.4 -57.1 -61.6 78.0 -57.2 –63.7 
Black 9.4 -3.8 -1.1 10.0 -2.0 -3.7 11.0 -1.0 -3.7 
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Hispanic 3.9 +22.6 +41.4 5.0 +25.0 +45.3 7.8 +24.9 +51.5 
Asian 0.7 +28.6 +20.3 0.7 +31.7 +19.2 1.3 +33.2 +17.5 
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 TABLE 3.  Logit Models for Public Employment 
 
Federal Employment 1990 2000 2009-11 
Naturalized Citizen -0.21 -0.29 -0.52 
 (11.70) (17.30) (15.71) 
 
Not a Citizen -0.99 -0.89 -1.29 
 (36.11) (35.56) (30.23) 
 
Base probability (native-born citizen) 4.6 3.7 3.8 
Probability difference for  
    Naturalized Citizen -0.9 -0.9 -1.5 
    Non-citizen -2.9 -2.1 -2.7 
 
Observations (millions) 3.3 3.9 2.5 
 
                                           
SLG Employment 1990 2000 2009-11 
Naturalized Citizen -0.55 -0.51 -0.30 
 (40.39) (49.62) (13.26) 
 
Not a Citizen -0.96 -1.04 -0.91 
 (57.97) (80.40) (35.65) 
 
Base probability (native-born citizen) 11.1 11.6 14.1 
Probability difference for  
    Naturalized Citizen -4.4 -4.3 -3.3 
    Non-citizen -6.5 -7.2 -7.9 
  
Observations (millions) 3.0 3.8 2.4 
 
 
 
Table 3B Federal Employment 
 1990 2000 2009-11 
Naturalized Citizen 
Full sample -0.21 -0.29 -0.52 
Latinos only -0.46 -0.39 -0.50 
Asians only +0.09 -0.03 -0.17 
 
Not a Citizen 
Full sample -0.99 -0.89 -1.29 
Latinos only -1.16 -0.98 -1.47 
Asians only -0.77 -0.79 -0.97 
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                                             State and Local Government Employment 
 1990 2000 2009-11 
Naturalized Citizen 
Full sample -0.55 -0.51 -0.30  
Latinos only -0.53 -0.47 -0.17 
Asians only -0.48 -0.63 -0.33 
 
Not a Citizen 
Full sample -0.96 -1.04 -0.91  
Latinos only -1.05 -1.03 -0.96 
Asians only -0.74 -0.99 -0.66 
 
All coefficients are significant at .0001 level.  Numbers in parentheses are robust z-
statistics.  Coefficients are based on weighted logit models that include nine dummy 
variables for race/ethnicity and gender, linear and squared estimated years of work 
experience, years of education plus four dummy variables for degrees (bachelor’s, 
master’s, professional, and doctoral), six dummy variables for relationship status (men 
and women living with same-sex or different-sex partner or not living with partner), and 
two dummy variables for military service and whether it qualifies for federal veterans’ 
preference.  Sample is restricted to full-time (36+ hours/week), full-year (50+ weeks) 
employees.  Federal employees are dropped from state/local models.  State/local 
models also include 50 dummy variables for state of residence.  All probabilities 
calculated at sample means. 
 
 Table 4. Explaining Under-Representation of Immigrants 
Federal Employment 1990 2000 2009-11 
 
Naturalized Citizen 
Base model  -0.07 -0.06 -0.16 
Full model -0.28 -0.29 -0.52 
 
Model without English proficiency -0.22 -0.30 -0.55 
Model without veteran -0.42 -0.44 -0.80 
Model without age -0.19 -0.23 -0.50 
Model without education -0.18 -0.27 -0.52 
 
Not a Citizen 
Base model  -1.18 -1.16 -1.50 
Full model -1.05 -0.89 -1.29 
 
Model without English proficiency -1.03 -0.93 -1.41 
Model without veteran -1.24 -1.07 -1.62 
Model without age -0.99 -0.95 -1.35 
Model without education -1.04 -0.94 -1.35 
 
 
SLG Employment 1990 2000 2009-11 
Naturalized Citizen 
Base model  -0.29 -0.33 -0.43 
Full model -0.56 -0.46 -0.30 
 
Model without English proficiency -0.51 -0.49 -0.33 
Model without veteran -0.56 -0.47 -0.32 
Model without age -0.47 -0.41 -0.26 
Model without education -0.44 -0.37 -0.27 
 
Not a Citizen 
Base model  -0.90 -1.11 -1.44 
Full model -0.98 -0.95 -0.91 
 
Model without English proficiency -1.04 -1.05 -1.03 
Model without veteran -0.98 -0.98 -0.93 
Model without age -0.96 -1.00 -0.95 
Model without education -0.90 -0.86 -0.89 
 
Numbers are logit coefficients from 36 different logit models (6 different models x 2 
sectors x 3 time periods).  Naturalized citizen and non-citizen coefficients come from 
same models.  Full model includes measures of English proficiency, military service, 
age, and education; base model includes none.  Each of the other four models drops 
 one set of variables to see how the coefficients for naturalized citizens and non-citizens 
change when that variable is not controlled. 
  
